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It is the charge of economic history not only to explain the economic past, but to use it to enrich 
and develop economic theory (North, 1994). In paleoeconomics, theory plays the additional role 
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 1.  Introduction 
 
In the beginning of his Nobel lecture, Douglass North opined that "The object of the field [of 
economic history] is not only to shed new light on the economic past, but also to contribute to 
economic theory by providing an analytical framework that will enable us to understand 
economic change." In paleoeconomics, the roles of theory and evidence may appear even more 
indeterminate. Note only can sparse evidence provide stylized facts that result in theory that 
applies both to the case in question and elsewhere, but theory may help to provide an account of 
what happened that is internally consistent as well as being consistent with the sparse evidence. 
To this end, we attempt herein to illuminate both the nature and causes of growth and 
institutional change by using both archeological and historical evidence from the settlement and 
modernization of the Hawaiian economy to develop a candidate theory of the natural co-
evolution of production systems, organizational forms and authority structures.  
  We focus our search by summarizing the physical evidence brought forward by Kirch 
and his interdisciplinary team of researchers on Hawaiian pre-history.  As we do, these 
researchers choose Hawaii because  
“the archipelago… presents an ideal region for understanding complex 
interactions between human populations and their environments. In Hawaii such 
interactions can be tracked over a time frame of about 1200 years. During this 
period between the discovery and colonization of the archipelago by humans and 
the arrival of Europeans, archaeological research reveals the emergence of a 
highly complex island civilization which by A.D. 1700 had approached the level 
of an “archaic state.” In Hawaii, historical anthropologists and natural scientists 
have the opportunity to study the emergence of such complexity in the context of 
dynamic coupling with natural systems.” (Kirch, 2007) 
 
We present sparse evidence in support of stylized facts about Hawaiian economic 
development, and expand the discussion into the historic era, where Hawaiian economic 
development shifts rapidly, though not uniformly, from hierarchical control to decentralized 
decision-making. 
 2.  Archeological and Historical Record 
  Over Hawaiian history, social organization went from family to hierarchy to more 
complex and larger hierarchy (vertical and horizontal expansion) to private.  Transitions were 
gradual, e.g. with some private property coexisting with hierarchies. Even the great Mahele, 
often historically billed as a quick transformation in 1848 from hierarchy to private property, 
took many years to settle, and was incomplete, i.e. it left much land and marine resources as 
common property. 
  The standard division in Hawaiian history between the pre-historic record (until Western 
Contact in 1778) and the historic record masks the underlying pressures affecting the rapid 
institutional change that occurred following Western Contact.  We divide the timeline with a 
slight distinction, first focusing on the evolution from the colonization of the islands to the 
monarchy and then investigating the switch to decentralized decision-making that evolved over 
the course of the 19
th Century.  This distinction helps drive the theory of institutional adaptation 
and its co-evolution with economic development as a function of the underlying economic 
pressures presented by factors that include resource use (intensification, capital formation, and 
abandonment) and relative price shifts from changes in supply and demand. 
  The co-evolution of governance and property with respect to resource scarcity can be 
clearly illustrated by considering these two distinct periods in Hawaiian history.  The first period 
is further divided into sub-periods wherein property structures, governance, and scarcity 
pressures changed. The first period, encompassing all of Hawaii’s pre-history, is divided by 
anthropologists into 4 eras: (1) Colonization, (2) Developmental, (3) Expansion, and (4) Proto-
historic, which we link to their corresponding economic interpretations: extensive growth, 
intensive growth, and capitalization, and add (5) Unification, and (6) Independent kingdom, 
during which new opportunities for trade are introduced under an intensifying system of 
hierarchical control of a diminishing native population.  The second period consists of the 
decline of the kingdom and the evolution to decentralization as a U.S. territory/state, categorized 
by increasing opportunities for trade and marked by differences in decentralization of common 
property resources as a function of their value. 
2.1. Co-evolution of Specialization and Hierarchy before Private Property   Figure 1 summarizes available archeological and proto-historic evidence on the timing of 
Hawaiian cultural development until just after Western Contact.  We reclassify these stylized 
anthropological periods for Hawaii (Kirch, 1985) until unification under Kamehameha I (the 
inception of the monarchy) to depict stages of economic growth. During this time, the 
institutional framework evolved from family networks to an intensive hierarchy though the 
overall ahupua’a and kapu systems operations maintained a defining continuity.
1  These systems 
of production and enforcement could be, and were, intensified or relaxed, within limits, to 
accommodate population growth and capital formation.   
 
                                                 
1 See appendix 1 in Kaiser and Roumasset 2007  
Figure 1: Timeline for Hawaiian resource use and development  
(Adapted from Kirch (1985), p. 300-1 
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  Colonization and development are combined as a period of extensive growth as 
Polynesians arrive and sparsely settle coastal areas, moving slowly upland.  Populations may 
have been very small, perhaps 100 people in an extended ‘ohana (Kirch, 1996).  Governance for 
some time after the Polynesians arrived in Hawaii (roughly 400 A.D.) developed under an 
´ohana (community management) system wherein the patriarchs of each extended family 
determined production and enforcement. Extremely low populations, the introduction of new 
agricultural products (e.g., pigs, taro), and the slow subsequent transformation of the most fertile valleys (wet, windward areas), adjacent to superior fishing grounds, grew into populated 
communities. Marine and terrestrial resource pressures were low,
2 and though societal 
institutions to govern resource scarcity, particularly the kapu (taboo) system, had traveled to 
Hawaii with the earliest Polynesian settlements, implementation and enforcement were low 
(Kirch, 1996).   
  From these beginnings, we see continuous evidence of increasing intensification of 
production both on land and at sea.  Technology becomes standardized, evidence of intermediate 
goods produced by a rising class of specialized adz-makers and fishhook producers (Kirch, 1985, 
p. 184).   
As populations grew and became more permanent in the Developmental era and into the 
expansion era, governance by family eventually extended to governance of the entire ahupua´a 
valley, under a single chief or ali´i.  During the Expansion Period (1100-1650) population 
estimates increase to several hundred thousand, with some estimates as high as 800,000 (Kirch, 
1985; Kame´eleihiwa, 1992).  The acceleration of population growth, particularly from 1200-
1650, was followed by the intensification of food production, including capitalization. Soil 
analyses of dryland agriculture indicate that virtually all arable lands were brought under 
cultivation (Kirch et al, 2004).  The chief allocated land and labor within a valley to their uses 
and began to take advantage of the top-down power to achieve economies of scale and increased 
production intensity through specialization, eventually building large-scale irrigation projects 
and fish ponds in particular.  Governance also accelerated, particularly at the end of the period.  
The archaeological record shows increased temple-building, consolidated control, and expansion 
of territory on both Maui and Hawaii from 1570-1630 (Kirch, 2005). 
  Other indications of intensified governance come from fish pond management.  Strict 
limited access to the ponds controlled rent dissipation, and governance measures increased 
accordingly.
3  With little trading between ahupua´a, and the ability of the ali´i to reserve the 
                                                 
2 It is clear from bone pile analyses that pig and dog populations were growing rapidly over the time period and 
increasingly supplementing the fish protein collected from the sea, and resources were increasing as transplanted 
food species took hold in the new environment. 
3 Only 30% of ahupua´a had associated fishponds (ponds never crossed ahupua´a borders), and the ponds’ total area 
of about 6650 acres would have produced somewhere between 1.75 million and 2 million pounds of fish per year – 
about 6 to 9 pounds per person per annum at the time of contact (Kikuchi, 1985; Hammon, 1975). Population in the 
islands has been conservatively estimated at 200,000-225,000 in 1778, at contact. catch for themselves, fishponds produced considerably greater sustenance for the higher levels of 
the social hierarchy with little direct benefit to the commoners, though indirect benefits stemmed 
both from reduced fishing pressure on the coastal fisheries and from the increased fish 
population overall.  
 The  hierarchical  ahupua´a system allowed the capture of the economies of scale 
necessary to develop these fishponds while the complementary kapu system provided the 
mechanism by which efficient harvesting could be enforced. Inasmuch as the ali´i captured the 
rents, this exemplifies a case in which the primary action group (Davis and North) undertakes 
the institutional innovation in question. 
  This system of control evolved into an extensive hierarchy during the Expansion era and 
eventually crystallized during the proto-historic period (1650-1785), at the height of the islands’ 
population, exhibiting a much higher degree of social hierarchy, specialization, and governance 
structure than in other parts of Polynesia (Abbott, 1992; Handy and Handy, 1991).  
  Within this growing hierarchy, decision-making and authoritative duties begin to be 
addressed by different parties acting for the chiefs. “Low-level” konohiki resource managers
4 
develop increasingly sophisticated irrigation
5 and communal fishing techniques, and fishponds 
are developed and evolve into true aquaculture,
6 a unique Hawaiian development amongst 
Polynesian cultures, to increase productivity. Kinship networks give way to specialized skills in 
fishing and farming, managed by the konohiki.  Without external trade, hierarchical stratification 
increases, as do efforts at resource extraction for the benefit of the ali’i.  The commoners 
produce for the konohiki, who controlled the water supply, determined the land allocations for 
the commoners, determined fishing rights, and allocated ahupua’a resources for production, 
especially labor for communal projects. The konohiki’s duty to the ali’i was to meet an expected 
production goal to be presented during the makahiki festival, at which time the ali’i divided the 
tribute amongst his supporters in the chiefly class, including the konohiki.  Increased governance 
came from the parallel development of a large priesthood and increasing use of the kapu to 
                                                 
4 For illustration of Hawaiian hierarchy, see Kaiser and Roumasset 2007 
5 In particular, increased use of Type III irrigation systems, consisting of an irrigation canal running along the 
periphery of the field complex, allowing more sophisticated control of water distribution than was used in earlier 
Type II systems, where small groups of fields were watered by a single ditch that fed directly into the uppermost 
field. 
6 True aquaculture means that fish are bred and nourished in captivity; other Polynesian fishponds were holding pens 
fed by ocean tides. restrict resource use and population.  This mechanism supported an increasingly stratified 
society. 
  This stratification appears to have steepened more rapidly on marginal lands than on 
lands that produced large surpluses easily (Kirch et al., 2004, Vitousek et al, 2004).  Without 
additional trade opportunities to increase economic growth, the proto-historic period also 
experiences increased warfare over increasingly scarce resources, mainly initiated by chiefs 
controlling these marginal lands.  Appendix 2 summarizes in table form (see Kaiser and 
Roumasset 2007). 
  Hierarchy lingered past Western contact and its institutions for private property, 
culminating in the Hawaiian kingdom formed under Kamehameha I in 1805.  Most local 
resources experienced dramatic changes in value and governance needs after western contact, 
however.  While rent extraction by the Hawaiian chiefs was expected and accepted as the way of 
life, the hierarchical authority included a mechanism for transferring these rents every generation 
in order to maintain consolidated support for the ali´i nui, or head chief.  This mechanism, the 
mahele, was a redistribution of rights from top to bottom that occurred with every change of 
leadership.  With consolidation into the Hawaiian kingdom under King Kamehameha I after 
western contact, rent extraction opportunities increased rapidly.  Kamehameha I, however, was a 
conservationist, and under his reign, three major fishpond projects were undertaken, and 
sandalwood trading with Westerners was carefully managed.   
  Enforcement costs of the consolidated hierarchy increased under his successor, Liholiho. 
Unable to bring about a mahele, the chiefs gained power to extract greater rents of their own, 
with greater competitive pressures among them, and sandalwood resources quickly dwindled 
(LaCroix and Roumasset I). The introduction of new religious institutions (Christianity in 
particular) and the apparent impotence of the Hawaiian gods in protecting the population from 
Western diseases rendered the kapu system less effective and the system was officially 
abandoned in 1819.  (Kame’eleihiwa, 1992, p 140ff). Sandalwood was depleted by 1850, leaving 
not only a void in tradable goods, but also considerable environmental degradation to 
watersheds.  Thus the greater scarcity of extractable resources increased the benefits of 
conservation just as the hierarchical institution designed to protect them failed due to the 
increased costs of governance    The subsequent transition to private property, frequently portrayed as an overnight coup 
defined as the Great Mahele of 1848, was neither instantaneous nor complete. Neither fully-
formed fences nor production and enforcement systems materialized overnight, though the 
relative cost of moving to private property, despite the large initial fixed costs of the Great 
Mahele and in establishing a series of constitutions, had become efficient. The scope and breadth 
of central government authority increased; these constitutions established a cabinet, a civil 
service, and an independent judiciary by 1847. Through this expensive investment government 
lowered per-unit costs of providing governance and ensured a higher level would be provided.  
At the same time, the move lowered informational costs by enabling decentralized decision-
making through private property.       
  The native population decreased, perhaps by 90% in a generation, rapidly deflating the 
pressures that drove specialization, intensification, and the growth of governance before Western 
contact.  New products were introduced driving fundamental economic shifts and reducing the 
effectiveness of ahupua’a management in meeting society’s needs.  The kapu governance system 
was soon in tatters, raising the enforcement costs of hierarchy.    
  The population decline after Western contact was not accompanied by a direct reduction 
in resource pressures, however.  Resource pressure from population growth alone is therefore 
insufficient to explain increases in governance and intensification.  Instead, relative prices for 
resources began to shift; for example, with respect to marine resources, benefits from coastal 
fisheries for local demands were reduced while benefits from ocean fisheries for trade expanded.  
Institutions shifted accordingly, and governance efforts did not abate, as the new judicial system 
and placed control over public goods, particularly education, in the hands of a representative 
legislature (Daws, 1974, p. 107), which over time imposed more stringent rights and governance 
on the increasingly valuable ocean fisheries and a return to less stringent and more local 
enforcement in less valuable coastal fisheries.   
  As a less costly governance mechanism available within the existing Hawaiian 
institutions, the konohiki maintained governance rights over these less valuable coastal, 
common-property fisheries.  Private decision-making within the new property rights system for 
fisheries continued to balance enforcement costs against benefits as well.  Konohiki sought to 
incur the costs of fishery registration when the asset was more valuable, leaving less valuable assets to open access. Enforcement declined across all coastal fisheries as the resource value 
decreased over time.   
  Opportunities for exchange also promote specialization and intensification by increasing 
the value of the resource base.  As the consumption set expands to include gains from trade and 
as the number of potential transactions expands, centralization of decisions will face increased 
costs as the informational burden increases.  Efficiency is likely to give way to rent-seeking.  
Centralization of authority, however, should increase in order to meet increased governance 
requirements.  These governance costs will include the high fixed costs of transitioning to a rule 
of law and establishing rights to property.   
2.2. Stylized Facts and Synthesis 
We can conveniently summarize from this archaelogical and historical record, the  
stylized facts before and after Western contact. 
Before contact: The increase in population before Western contact was associated with 
increasing horizontal specialization and intensification of agricultural production and resource 
use. Both the control and decision-making aspects of governance became more centralized. 
Social heirarchies were closely aligned with increasingly vertically specialized managerial 
structures. Specialization was primarily within ahupua’a hierarchies not across hierarchies. 
After contact: Slightly before Western contact, and increasingly after contact, population 
declined, but intensification and specialization continued due to the opportunities afforded by 
international trade. Private property developed and decision-making became decentralized. 
Specialization across hierarchies developed along with trade. 
  Figure 2 illustrates these stylized facts. As private property expands, governance costs 
and government responsibility increase. Private property does not obviate the need for 
government intervention.  As decision-making is decentralized, growth and development require 
institutional support for voluntary contractual exchange as well as for resolving externalities and 
public good problems imposed by the conflicting goals of individual decision-makers. At low 
levels of scarcity and specialization, centralization of authority and decisions increase together, 
to reduce idiosyncratic risks through mutual insurance and diversification, and exploit economies of scale in production, e.g. large scale irrigation works.  The goal of the theoretical development 
to follow is to explain these patterns. 
 














  As resource pressures increase, returns to specialization, intensification, capitalization 
and governance require additional centralization of authority and decision-making, which can be 
developed in small populations, with limited opportunities for external economies of trade, 
through hierarchy.  With larger populations or a change in opportunities for trade, hierarchy’s 
relative inability to solve information problems may lead to institutional changes favoring 
decentralization of decision-making while increasing centralization of authority in the form of 
property rights.   
  At this point, the existing second-best theory suggests that institutions will change 
whenever the net benefits to doing so are positive.  In particular, institutions that manage 
resources through common property, public property, or private property are perceived as 
comparable solutions to the open access problem, and comparing these institutions according to 
the extended Demsetz theory involves weighing known enforcement costs against the benefits 
that a particular institution delivers by reducing free-riding.  
 3.  Dynamic Theory of Resource Use and Institutional Change  
3.1. A Resource Capital Theoretical Base 
The evolution of property has been at the heart of the New Institutional Economics since 
its inception.  However, the theory is incomplete regarding the nature of agency costs and the 
lack of capital-theoretic foundations. We hypothesize that property coevolves with governance, 
which increases with the intensification and specialization of production; increasing scarcity of 
land and marine resources leads to more and broader governance and greater resource use 
restrictions, if enforcement mechanisms are also free to evolve.  By drawing on the relatively 
short time span between settlement and modernization of the Hawaiian economy, we clarify at 
least one plausible mechanism for this co-evolution.  As Hawaii moved from a Neolithic group 
of small isolated villages to a unified kingdom and finally to U.S. territorial status and eventual 
statehood, old and new institutions, some of which were imposed, overlapped. The experience 
provides an intriguing opportunity to study the natural co-evolution of decision and authority 
structures as resource scarcity, productivity, and trade increase, population fluctuates, production 
intensifies, and economic growth is characterized by both vertical and horizontal specialization. 
In the Coasean paradigm, first-best efficiency, whether achieved through decentralized, 
centralized, or intermediate institutions, is only a point of departure for comparative institutional 
analysis. What is needed is a conceptual framework capable of generating propositions and 
explanations regarding which institution is second-best efficient under what circumstances.
7  The 
advocates of private property (Demsetz), public property (Hardin), and communitarianism 
(Ostrom) all implicitly agree that the relative efficacy of these institutions rests primarily on their 
ability to control the free-rider problem. 
   Field (1989) extends Demsetz’s theory of institutional change in a useful but incomplete 
fashion. Field begins by noting that economic organization and growth of non-industrial 
economies can be classified into three stages. In the first stage, production is organized by 
families or small groups of families.  In the second stage, these groups are consolidated into 
larger communal units.  In the third stage, production devolves to family farms or other small 
production units, facilitated by private property.  Accordingly, the evolution of property can be 
                                                 
7 This use of second-best follows Dixit (1996).  He subsumes rent-seeking, corruption, and other elements of 
political economy is his theory of the 3
rd-best. 
 indexed by the number of commons.  Complete decentralization under private property is 
achieved when the number of commons equals the number of firms (or families). 
  The theory is still incomplete, however, in a number of respects. The primary problem is 
that each institution is implicitly associated with a fixed value of benefits and costs. This is not 
Field’s unique problem but the problem with the theory of institutional change generally.
8 
Consider the marginal benefits of dividing the resource among more groups, each of which is 
responsible for its management. The proposition is that the costs of rent dissipation will go down 
with increased division. Field properly includes the costs of group contracting in with the costs 
of rent dissipation. The idea is that group contracting costs will go down in aggregate because of 
Olson’s Law
9 and that rent-dissipation will go down because there is more accountability with 
smaller groups and the free rider problem will be better contained. But an optimization problem 
has been suppressed in this reasoning. For the group to manage its resources efficiently it will 
invest in group contracting and management until the marginal costs of so doing are equal to the 
marginal reduction in the value of rent dissipation that is achieved thereby. 
  Similarly, “exclusion costs” are at best a reduced form function of the number of 
commons. The suppressed optimization problem involves increasing exclusion expenditures until 
marginal value of reduced theft etc. equals marginal cost thereof. In section 4, we attempt to 
make these tradeoffs more transparent by exploiting the key insight of Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) that agency costs and residual departures from first-best efficiency are jointly determined. 
In addition, the potential economies of scale and opportunities for specialization need to be 
incorporated in assessing that tradeoff. Finally, inasmuch as the evolution of economic 
organization is fundamentally dynamic, the theory must rest on capital-theoretic foundations. 
  Inasmuch as government has a comparative advantage in some information and 
enforcement activities, we can extend these total system costs to include those of constitutional 
governance, e.g. defining and enforcing property rights (Libecap, 1978). In McChesney’s (2002) 
consideration of the famous cattle-trampling of crops, enforcement is not limited to fencing but 
includes monitoring and enforcement activities by the state. In the efficient solution, 
governments and private actors each perform those information/enforcement activities in which 
                                                 
8 Conventional theories treat different institutions as discreet entities.  Field and Anderson-Hill (1975) implicitly 
index different institutions by a continuous variable. 
9 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965). they have a comparative advantage, much as the Coasean firm chooses to coordinate some 
production itself and subcontracts other production to outside suppliers. In this view property can 
arise through private enforcement efforts (e.g. Demsetz’s (1967) Native American beaver 
trappers and Anderson-Hill’s (1975) fencing farmers) or through Libecap’s (1978) property-
defining government. 
One significant conceptual weakness of property rights theory is its overall lack of capital 
theoretic foundations.  As an asset’s value increases, it is natural to expect that investments in 
protecting or enhancing its value will increase over time.  Anderson and Hill (1990) have 
provided a dynamic theory of a one-time investment in enforcement costs, e.g. building a fence, 
but have not considered the possibility of increasing governance-capital over time.  
  Even the extended theories of Anderson and Hill (1990) and Lueck (2002) are 
incomplete, however. First, they analyze only the steady-state institutional costs, wherein rents 
are fully dissipated under open access, fully captured under private property, and common 
property regimes lead to resource exploitation that lies between these steady states.  Further, both 
implicitly assume that the enforcement costs of a particular institution are clearly defined. This in 
turn suppresses the problem of determining, for a particular organizational form, how much and 
what form of governance is optimal. For the case of common property management, for 
example, the community must determine the rights and responsibilities of members, and choose 
an incentive structure as well as its technology of enforcement. Until this governance structure is 
specified, neither the benefits nor costs can be determined.  
 
In what follows, we exploit resource economics in a more generalized and dynamic 
setting to provide a theory that encompasses the full spectrum of Hawaiian economic 
development.   
Suppose that a resource stock at time t is s(t) is extracted at rate x(t) at a cost of c(s(t)) per 
unit to obtain benefits (consumer surplus). Assume that P(z) is the inverse demand function or 
price of the resource. The cost of extraction is assumed to be a decreasing function of its own 
stock, c’(s)≤0. The stock increases with natural growth, F(s(t)), and decreases with harvest, x(t). The natural growth function, F(s), is assumed to have the traditional properties; strictly concave 
and attains a maximum at a finite value of s. Over time, the rate of change in stock is then, 
. Given discount rate r, a hypothetical social planner chooses the resource 
extraction path, x(t), to maximize the present value of net social welfare, which includes the 
consumer surplus from resource consumption minus the cost of extraction, i.e., 
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Rearranging the first-order conditions, we obtain an expression for resource royalty:  
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Solving the first-order conditions together: 
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         (1.1) where P is the resource price, and the RHS represents the marginal opportunity cost (MOC), 
composed of c, its marginal extraction cost (MXC), and the marginal user cost evaluated at the 
end of the period (MUC);
10  
  Since the right-hand side of (1.1) is the marginal opportunity cost, (1.1) states that 
optimal resource extraction is achieved when the marginal benefit (price) of resource use equals 
the marginal opportunity cost.
11  Equation 1.1 implicitly defines both the optimal stock (S*) and 
the optimal extraction ( * x ), at any point in time.   
  For clarity and generality, we do not illustrate the possible dynamic paths that optimal 
resource use takes over time here (see e.g. Clark, 1990, for visual representation), nor do we 
model the human population growth or labor decision as integral to the use of the resource stock; 
unlike the Brander-Taylor (1998) model we do not assume that the population is dependent on 
this resource for survival and thus we assume a more broadly applicable, exogenous demand 
curve that easily reflects changes in relative prices for alternative goods. This also allows us to 
avoid limiting our analysis by choice of functional form. Rather we describe the static first and 
second-best outcomes at different points in time to emphasize the shift in resources to 
compensate for the move to the second-best outcome.   
  Figure 3 illustrates the static efficiency possibilities for optimal and second-best 
outcomes for resource use.  Panel A of Figure 2 illustrates the standard first-best optimal 
resource extraction x*, where MB=MOC1, in contrast to open access extraction (xOA) which 
occurs where marginal benefit equals marginal extraction cost for a single time period.  Note, 
however, that if the resource is plentiful enough so that MOC intersects MB at XOA, i.e. 
, then open access (X 0 MUC = OA) is first-best efficient.
12 If the resource is even more abundant, 
then equilibrium extraction can be less than socially optimal. While this possibility was 
appreciated in the past (Huxley, 1881; Taylor, 1951), it has been overlooked or even denied in 
                                                 
10 Strictly speaking, marginal user cost is defined as the reduction in the present value of the stock from extracting 
an additional unit (Dorfman, 1969). By convention, however, MUC in resource economics is typically evaluated at 
the end of one period so that it is commensurate with royalty. That is, the second term on the RHS of 1.1 is the 
Dorfman marginal-user-cost times one plus the real rate of interest. 
11 See e.g. Pearce and Turner (1990). 
12 It is not impossible that MUC<0, in which case open access actually wastes economic opportunities with under-
harvesting of the resource as this subsidy from the future gains to today’s harvest is not realized. the literature since Gordon’s (1954) portrayal of the fishery dismissed it. We resurrect it here as 































Figure 3:  A second-best theory of resource management 




























  In Panel A, we see that as MOC increases to MOC2, either through increasing extraction 
costs or increasing scarcity, the optimal amount of resource extraction should decrease.  If, on the other hand, demand were to increase (not shown), the optimal amount of resource extraction 
should increase. With both shifts occurring simultaneously, the net effect on extraction will 
depend on the relative size of the shifts. 
  Panel B reflects these curves’ mirror images to show clearly the marginal benefits 
(MBC1) and marginal costs (MCC) of conservation of the resource in the form of reduced 
extraction, so that first-best optimal conservation is xOA- x
*, where the marginal benefit of 
conservation equals its marginal cost.  Notice again that only if MUC’=0 can open access 
provide the first-best level of conservation. The increase in MOC from Panel A translates to an 
increase in MBC from MBC1 to MBC2, indicating an increase in the optimal level of 
conservation. Similarly, an increase in MB will reduce the Marginal Conservation Cost.   
However, the reduction in MCC does not translate to a reduction in optimal conservation, since 
the Marginal Opportunity Costs are increasing in extraction, and the open access level of 
harvesting is greater with higher demand, the conservation effort under a higher level of demand 
will be larger since units of the resource that had no value at lower price levels now generate 
marginal benefits from conservation.   
  Now recognizing enforcement (e.g. building fences, catching violators) and other costs of 
administering conservation, we can see that second-best optimal enforcement is generally less 
than that of the first-best solution.  There remains ambiguity in these administrative costs.  For 
now, one can think of the Marginal Governance Costs (MGC) as being either “short run,” i.e. 
within a specific institutional framework, or “long run,” i.e. the optimized governance structures 
including institutional change.  
  The form of these governance costs is here assumed to be increasing in the resource 
stock.  This fits with the existing literature; it also highlights the limited dimensionality of the 
existing literature.  As Allen (2002) and others have tried to explore these almost amorphous 
governance costs within the Coase-Demsetz framework, they have focused on one portion or 
another of a broad definition of transactions costs to fit a particular case.  This broad definition 
can be divided into two camps, the “neoclassical” camp, where transaction costs are costs of 
exchange, and the “property rights” camp, where transactions costs are all costs of establishing 
and enforcing property rights (Allen, 1998).    Using the property rights definition, anything that is inefficient is a transaction cost, and 
this “deus ex machina” approach is more convenient than it is informative.  We seek to make the 
components of our governance costs explicit, including transaction, agency, and enforcement 
costs. Thus, we first define governance costs G(S), a function of conservation, S,  as 
constitutional agency costs, including the actual resources used up in the enforcement and 
organizational effort plus the shirking costs that remain.
13  We elaborate further below, but it is 
instructive now, using this generic definition that is free from institutional form, to examine the 
impact of resource stock pressures on governance. 
  Now, we incorporate enforcement (e.g. building fences, catching violators) and other 
costs of administering conservation into the problem. Let xOA represent the open-access 
extraction rate (where P=c). The level of conservation, thus, can be represented by the difference 
between open-access extraction (no conservation) and real extraction, i.e. xOA-x. We assume that 
the governance cost, G, is an increasing function of conservation G’(xOA-x) >0. In other words, 
the marginal governance cost (MGC) is positive. G is assumed to be a stable function of 
conservation, i.e. even though the marginal benefits of conservation change over time, the cost 
function does not. Recognizing governance cost, the resource optimization problem can be 
written as: 
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Setting up the Hamiltonian and solving the first-order conditions as in 1.1, we have: 
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13 For the special case where the organization is a firm, governance costs are agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Roumasset, 1995).    Panel C shows the net marginal benefits of conservation (NMBC1) and introduces the 
governance costs (MGC), which are assumed to increase with the level of conservation.  The net 
marginal benefit of conservation (MBC-MCC) is the marginal benefit of controlling resource 
use.  The optimum governance of resource extraction occurs where this marginal benefit equals 
the marginal cost of governance whether it be through socialism, capitalism, or 
communitarianism.  Notice that in this case, open access may be second best optimal, and it is 
not necessary for MUC’=0 to achieve this result. 
  This provides a suggested framework for integrating resource management and 
governance, under which we can show that open access can be second-best optimal.  Finally, we 
demonstrate that the effect of increasing demand and/or resource depletion is an increase in 
optimal governance.  
  The structure provided in equation 1.2 can be used to explain the co-evolution of 
governance and natural resource management.  As the curves shift to reflect population pressures 
and resource availability, the second-best optimal solution may change.  The shift presented in 
Figure 3 corresponds to an increase in resource pressures over time leading to increased 
conservation.  When the population is low and resources abundant, so that MUC is small and 
MGC is large compared to the NMBC at the 1
st best optimal level of conservation, little or no 
governance costs are warranted.  Indeed if resource use is sufficiently low, open access may be 
2
nd-best optimal, as shown in panel C of Figure 3.    
 
3.2. Governance  
  Governance, within any institution, is the mechanism by which society pursues 
conservation. We label the conservation level at any given time period, OA x x − , as G(S). Note 
that the cost of resource misallocation, in terms of net marginal benefit to society, should not 
vary by institution.  Thus the NMBC, or the savings or losses from not using the resource in the 
current period, represent exchange costs from inefficient conservation under any institution.  We 
identify the net total conservation costs,  , as the costs of imperfect governance, in terms 
G
NMBC ∫of benefits foregone (GBF).
14  Thus, as the net total benefits of conservation increase (shift out), 
either through increasing demand for resources or reduced conservation costs, optimal 
governance will also increase, regardless of functional form or institutional structure and without 
requirement for institutional change.  
  One can think of two distinct forces acting to make MGC(S), and total governance costs, 
GC(S), increasing in the level of the resource stock.  First are the costs of enforcing against 
involuntary trades and reducing agency problems of cheating, or the transaction and enforcement 
costs.  These governance costs are expected to be positive and increasing in the stock of the 
natural resource (GC(S)>0, MGC(S)>0, MGC’(S)>0) as the cost of protecting every unit of the 
resource will be higher than the cost of protecting a single remaining unit.  Accordingly, these 
costs will vary in the short run within any institution, and may also vary in the long run as 
institutional structure affects changes in the cost structure.  The second group of costs consists of 
the informational costs of identifying all voluntary trades and reducing agency problems of 
defection.  The cost of identifying trades will be an increasing function of resource abundance, 
and hence conservation.  Additionally, the cost of identifying trades will clearly increase with the 
level of centralization of decision-making.  Fixed costs may also be incurred with respect to 
enforcing and identifying trades.  These costs are “long run” costs that vary by institution but are 
unlikely to vary considerably with the level of governance within a given institution.   
  For example, we expect that economies of scale are better captured under hierarchical 
management or institutions, while economies from specialization of trade are better captured 
under decentralization of decision-making.  These differences indicate that though governance 
costs are expected to increase under both institutions, they will not do so uniformly.  Thus, 
constitutional agency costs must be considered explicitly when analyzing economic development 
and growth.   
  These two types of costs will differ across institutions inasmuch as they differ in the 
centralization of decision-making and authority.  Thus, as we sum them into governance costs 
within an institutional framework, we acknowledge these distinctions explicitly.  In other words, 
if  G(S) delineates the efficient level of governance regardless of institution, where 
NMBC(S)=MGC(S), then each institution’s governance costs, GCi(S), where i indexes 
                                                 
14 Note that when GBF=0, Conservation is optimal for the given period. institutional choices, must be equal to or above the cost of achieving the efficient level for every 
level of governance, so that the minimum of GCi(S) delineates the second-best optimal 
governance level within an institution. The optimal institutional framework is determined by 
identifying the minimum across institutions, once all systems costs are included.  The 
institutional frameworks that best provide the efficient level of governance, G(S), will vary 
according to their ability to minimize system costs.   
  From equation (1.2), assuming that the extraction cost is constant, the optimal condition 















Assuming the initial stock of the resource (e.g. virgin forest, uncultivated soil quality, undepleted 
fish population) is higher than the steady state, the marginal user cost is increasing over time. If 
the demand function is constant, optimal resource extraction decreases over time, and, since open 
access extraction is constant for this case, optimal conservation increases.  
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  Figure 4. Comparative Institutional Transaction Cost Analysis 
 
  The upper panel of figure 4 shows the total benefit and the total cost of conservation over 
time. As the amount of optimal extraction decreases, the benefit of conservation increases until 
reaching the steady state. Assume that there are two institutions: hierarchy (no fixed cost, high 
marginal cost), and private property (fixed cost, low marginal cost). At t=0, where the 
conservation level is low, the governance cost of the hierarchy system is lower than that of the 
private property system. As the optimal conservation increases over time, the governance cost of 
the private property system become less expensive (at t*).    The lower panel shows the net benefit of the conservation. From time 0 to t*, the 
hierarchy system will be employed as it creates higher net benefits. However, as the conservation 
level increases, the advantage of the hierarchy system decreases. After time t*, the private 
property system becomes more efficient.  
  
4.  Application to the Hawaii Case 
4.1. Growth and institutional change 
  We hypothesize that had Hawaii maintained independence as a kingdom longer after 
western contact rather than becoming part of the United States in the late 1890s, the 
centralization of authority and decisions would have been unstable and failed to last (Glaeser & 
Shleifer, 2003).  Of the many Pacific Island kingdoms that developed via similar hierarchical 
processes to Hawaii, only Tonga remains a monarchy today. The Tongan monarchy is 
increasingly unstable, as population pressures that challenge longstanding mandates of land 
tenure
15 make it difficult to resist calls for democratic reform and devolution of power; its first 
democratically elected prime minister took office in 2006.   
  According to the theory set forth above, efficient governance becomes more centralized 
as an economy grows, while efficient decision-making becomes first more centralized then more 
decentralized.  An alternative path, where decision-making also continues to become more 
centralized, is not expected to be optimal as the constitutional agency costs shift to favor a 
system that minimizes governance costs at a higher governance level, capable of sustaining 
higher resource pressures.  Furthermore, within every institutional framework, governance 
efforts increase in response to benefits of greater specialization, intensification and greater 
resource scarcity. The Hawaiian record is consistent with this perspective. 
  Extensive growth, characterized by consistently replicated patterns of use, results in 
constant returns to inputs of labor and capital as long as the underlying resource base is constant.  
Extensive growth requires little governance or enforcement.  As such, decision structures may be 
fairly flat and authority rather decentralized.  In Hawaii, this is clearly the case in the 
                                                 
15 Each male at age 16 is to receive 8.25 acres [U.S. Department of State Background Note, Tonga, 2003] colonization and development eras; as ohana networks provide both the decision-making and the 
authority at the level of the extended family, or tribe.   
  Once the best land is brought under cultivation, production expands according to the 
increasingly intensive Ricardian gradient. As returns diminish, specialization and intensification 
may evolve to increase yields from an existing resource base through land-saving technical 
change. The use of labor-saving tools begins along with modest capital accumulation. Intensive 
growth is further promoted by specialization, as witnessed by standardization of production tools 
and techniques.  Increasingly centralized decision-making facilitates horizontal specialization by 
task. Vertical specialization increases. The chiefs and Ali’is are not replaced; they are merely 
consolidated by adding vertical layers. Governance expenditures increase accordingly as 
warranted by the gains from horizontal specialization. In the case of Hawaii, as population grew 
and spread from the coast inland, intensification generated stronger links between ohana and the 
hierarchical authority and decision-making increased together, taking advantage of increasing 
specialization in agricultural and fisheries inputs and outputs.   
  Evidence from joint archaeological and soil scientist work (Vitousek et al, 2004; Kirch et 
al, 2004) on the intensification of dryland agriculture on Maui and Hawaii versus the less labor-
intensive, higher-surplus irrigated wetland agriculture on Kauai and Oahu may explain why the 
more aggressive and expansive chiefdoms grew from Maui and Hawaii, and that final unification 
came under a chief from Hawaii, rather than the older islands of the archipelago.  These chiefs 
were motivated to increase their authority and expand their territory because the rents they could 
extract from the marginal lands they controlled were lower than those extracted by the chiefs 
irrigated wetlands. 
  As demand increases, whether due to increased population pressure or increased 
opportunities for rent-seeking, resource productivity may be enhanced through capitalization that 
captures economies of scale.  Infrastructure and other capital-deepening enterprises may increase 
the productivity of existing resources (e.g. the effect of irrigation on land and water productivity) 
and/or increase resource flows from existing stocks.  Increasingly centralized authority and 
decision-making will together increase the ability to capture economies of scale. As the 
hierarchical authority in Hawaii strengthened, large capital projects, particularly fishpond construction to enhance fish stocks and irrigation projects to increase taro production, were 
undertaken, with rents accumulating mainly to the high chiefs.
16
  Though the big picture of institutional change in Hawaii is one of increasing resource 
pressure accompanied by increasing governance and decentralization of authority, governance 
may also vary over space and time according to the present value of the remaining resource 
stock. For example, when costs of maintaining property rights increased for the konohiki 
fisheries at the end of the 19
th century, responses varied according to economic benefits of the 
resource, with higher-valued fisheries commanding greater effort in the establishment of rights.  
Furthermore, as time decreased the value of all coastal fisheries due to native population 
reduction, increasing international trade and the greater availability of preferred substitutes, 
governance over all coastal fisheries decreased.
17   
  Throughout the process of consolidation, the responsibilities of the commoners changed 
little; each was expected to perform his farming or fishing duties under the authority of the 
ahupua’a konohiki.  Two important trends evolved, however.  First, the commoners developed 
specialized skills (e.g. in taro and dryland farming and various fishing techniques), enhancing 
resource productivity while tying them more closely to the ahupua´a (Handy and Handy, 1991, 
p. 310ff).  Second, the konohiki’s role of manager evolved with increased responsibilities and 
specialized knowledge (e.g. organizing hukilau, irrigation and other communal activities). When 
the position of konohiki first emerged (during the expansion period), he was primarily a tax 
collector providing service for a superior ali’i in return for status and a portion of the harvests. 
By the time of the Great Mahele, his role had been gradually transformed into a position that 
claimed ownership of the resources, and the associated ability to make decisions.  This presented 
the attractive option to separate authority and decision-making in the move to private property by 
                                                 
16   From records of oral genealogical history, we know that populations must have been driven to create ponds 
as soon as there was sufficient labor available to do so, if appropriate environmental conditions existed. There are at 
least 6 fishponds constructed on Oahu and Kauai before the 13
th Century (Kikuchi, 1973).  Also at this time 
communities begin to develop in the drier, leeward valleys, suggesting population expansion and resource pressures.  
The primary growth in fishponds is attributed to the 16
th Century (Kikuchi, 1973), as is the growth in population.  
By the 18
th Century, repairs to existing ponds may have been as important as new construction.  The last ponds were 
constructed at the beginning of the 19
th Century, as Western contact and the resulting population decreases changed 
the social structure and manpower of the islands.  There were also more profitable opportunities for the ali´i 
developing in trade for other resources, particularly sandalwood. 
 
17 See Appendix 3 in Kaiser and Roumasset 2007 for supporting discussion leaving the management of low-value coastal resources to the konohiki, lowering governance 
costs of the new system.  
 
5.  Conclusions 
We provide a dynamic theory of property rights focused on the co-evolution of 
governance, specialization, intensification, and economic growth.  In particular, we elucidate the 
dynamic foundations needed for a complete theory of second-best resource management. We 
have also sketched a categorical theory explaining why, as the benefits of resource management 
increase with population pressure or other causes of specialization, governance costs increase 
both within and across institutions. A methodological point of possible interest is that second-
best analysis cannot proceed without first-best analysis. Indeed this is implicit in Coasean 
analysis.  It is precisely the proposition that, absent transaction costs, different institutions are 
capable of the same first-best solution, which allows us to use the first-best solution as a 
benchmark against which the transaction costs of alternative institutions can be compared.
18
More specifically, with respect to alternative solutions to the open access problem, we 
have shown the following.  First, it is not necessarily a problem; open access can be the first-best 
solution.  This is the case in early Hawaiian history, when resource pressures were low, and 
though the kapu institution was available as it was brought with the first settlers, its use was 
expectedly minimal. Second, even if open access is first-best inefficient, it is not necessarily the 
case that open access is inferior to at least one of the three proposed alternatives; it can be 
second-best efficient. Indeed, we have suggested that there is a second-best transition, as the 
optimal degree of specialization increases, from open access to common property management to 
private property, which helps to explain the governmental Kuznets curve. 
The second-best theory of induced institutional change predicts an increase in 
conservation effort as population pressure and modernization deplete natural resources. Unlike 
previous theoretical frameworks, the suggested theory allows for changing resource extraction 
(or changing investment) over time.  We witness this increase in conservation effort in Hawaii 
along with institutional development that benefits from the ability of hierarchy to capture 
economies of scale in land and resource management, and then seeks to benefit from the change 
                                                 
18 For this to be generally true, we must use transaction costs in its broadest sense, i.e. that transaction costs are the 
costs of running the economic system and are the equivalent of friction in physical systems (Williamson, 1985). in relative benefits by decentralizing decision-making into the hands of the konohiki rather than 
the king. The increase in governance and the institutional change from open access to the 
intermediate ahupua´a system and later to a centralized system accord with second-best theory. 
Religion and brutal hierarchical control were used effectively to enforce limited access at 
relatively low cost.  
  While the co-evolution of intensification, specialization, and consolidation are consistent 
with second-best theory, subsequent developments require third-best analysis. For example, 
while centralized governance was initially effective at resource conservation (under King 
Kamehameha I), the inherent opportunities for rent-seeking were exploited by King 
Kamehameha II (Liholiho) and subsequent rulers.  The intervention of Western culture and 
politics created an additional third-best force at odds with efficient institutional change. Western 
influence stressed the hierarchical system in at least two ways. First, it provided opportunities for 
specialization and trade beyond ahupua’a boundaries that were not readily captured under 
ahupua’a governance. Second, Western contact increased the benefits of extracting labor taxes 
from the commoners in order to import status goods.  
  From Hawaiian history, we garner three potential trends in institutional evolution. First, 
each institutional framework has some flexibility in accommodating increased governance. 
Governance within an institutional system can respond to changes in resource pressures, albeit 
large changes in relative prices may occasion a transition to new institutions.  Subsequently, we 
see continued evidence of the ways in which resource use intensifies and develops, creating 
economic growth, even with population decline rather than growth.  Finally, institutions do not 
simply switch instantaneously from one form to another, even when they are seemingly imposed.  
The example of the konohiki’s slow transition from a minion of the ali’i, to an incentive-driven 
resource owner, shows the shift from manager to owner that accompanies a shift from a common 
property regime to a private property one.   
As Hawaii’s population increased, production systems were intensified.  Social 
organization became increasingly complex, accommodating increasing division of labor. The 
increased vertical and horizontal specialization was facilitated by new incentive and governance 
structures summarized by the governmental Kuznets curve. Specifically, we witness a natural 
progression from a small, ohana network of reciprocal exchange, managed by a clan chief, to an increasingly stratified hierarchy and resulting in a monarchy in 1805.   With Western contact, 
relative resource values diverge greatly from the past, and a new path toward decentralization of 
decision-making begins while centralization of authority is transferred from one institutional 
framework to another but continues to intensify, despite the decline of population.  With respect 
to marine property, this increasingly centralized authority is evidenced in the increasing adoption 
of open-access fishing restrictions.  At the same time the government foregoes its previous rights 
to shares of the catch, which are dwindling in economic importance.  
  We see increased governance and development of hierarchy as populations grow.  In 
addition, it follows that the value of marginal land, as the land is being cleared with population 
growth and added to the resource base, satisfies the condition that the cost of clearing equals the 
present value of implicit rents that it earns in the future.  In this case, the marginal user cost of 
land as capital is constant until the land frontier is reached and intensification begins.  With even 
greater population pressure, intensification and resource depletion, however, potential gains from 
trade across districts increase (LaCroix and Roumasset, 1984) and the dictatorial hierarchies 
controlling each ahupua´a economy were not well suited to exploit those opportunities.  If such 
potential gains are large enough to warrant the increased governance costs of further 
centralization of authority (albeit not necessarily of decision-making), the second-best theory 
predicts that such institutional change will take place. At the time of Western contact, Hawaii 
was headed for just this sort of unification of authority.   
Inasmuch as Western institutions were exogenously imposed, we cannot be sure that 
hierarchical authority would have eventually withered away and been replaced by market 
institutions. Considerable specialization and exchange was possible within the hierarchical 
system. The development of the position of konohiki as a specialized land manager and then its 
transformation into resource owner exemplifies the interdependence of specialized skills and 
productivity, which intensifies along with institutional change. 
To the extent that inter-district trade is facilitated by centralized authority and 
decentralized decisions, two questions arise that may be suitable for further research. First, can 
the decentralization of decision-making evolve from the top-down system of medieval Europe or 
pre-contact Hawaii without violence or external force? Second, where decision-making is 
centralized as well as authority, e.g. as in socialism, is it prudent to transition directly to decentralized exchange at the national level or is devolving central authority to a sub-national 
level a useful intermediate step?  
We hope that the theory provided here is found to be applicable elsewhere. While we 
have emphasized the role of efficiency in determining the co-evolution of production and 
governance, extended models will have a less deterministic flavor. In particular, the balance of 
rent-seeking and efficiency will vary according to specific circumstances. While replacement of 
the Hawaiian monarchy by private property was accelerated by coincidence, other economies 
may exhibit more institutional inertia. Shocks to population (e.g. from disease), changing 
international demands and the transaction costs of trade, and shocks to the resource base itself, 
e.g. via invasive species, are natural candidates to explore in numerical analysis. References 
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